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Introduction 
Symphony orchestras have the classic cost structure leading to market failure and the 
nonprofit organizational form.  As a nonprofit, revenue sources include ticket sales, donations, 
government support, and other endeavors, leaving the determination of organizational goals 
uncertain. Quality programming, often part of the symphony mission statement, is associated 
with the nature of the repertoire.  Works of the classics, e.g., Mozart, Beethoven, Strauss, 
Shostakovich, Rachmaninoff, are assumed to be more “quality” orientated than less “popular” 
works.  Indeed, since the classics are the most popular, it is difficult to determine whether 
organizations with repertoires heavily biased towards the classics are quality, attendance, or 
budget maximizers.  Three recent articles examine the effect of government grants on the 
repertoire of performing arts organizations and provide some evidence concerning the effects of 
these subsidies on the behavior of the organizations. 
J. Lamar Pierce (2000) explores the effect of culture, politics, and government funding on 
the decisions made by American opera companies regarding the choice of repertoire over the 
period 1989-1994. Following DiMaggio and Stenberg (1985), Pierce develops Conventionality 
or Conformity Indices for 65 opera companies, 32 of which are included in his empirical work.  
The Index for an opera company is based on the average number of times an opera produced by 
one company is produced by all companies in the group.  For example if there are three 
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companies in an opera group and they produced 24 operas by three different authors, the Index 
of Conformity would be equal to 8, ignoring the fact that one opera might be performed 20 
times.  Higher values for the Index indicate greater degrees of conformity. 
Pierce regresses the conventionality index for the opera company on its budget, per capita 
city income, the percentage of revenue from non-federal public sources, the percentage of 
revenue from the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), and indices of conservatism and 
inflexibility for each city in which the opera is located.  While local government funding tends to 
promote more conventional programming, NEA funding has the opposite effect.  Pierce notes 
that these results are consistent with expectation, arguing that the NEA has a reputation for 
supporting more controversial and newer artistic productions and not pressuring recipients for 
certain types of behavior.  Local officials, Pierce argues, are more likely to apply pressure to 
support programs that appeal to wider audiences, which accounts for the finding that local 
government funding results in more conventional programming. 
James Heilbrun (2001) provides evidence of a decline in repertoire diversity in American 
opera companies. The data show that since the early 1990’s, U.S. Opera companies have shifted 
their programming to a more popular repertory.  Using data provided by Opera America, 
Heilbrun constructs Indices of Conformity and Herfindahl Indices for six opera seasons between 
1982/83 and 1997/9.  He concludes that over the time period examined, opera companies in 
America have been shifting performances toward more popular and less demanding repertory.  
John O’Hagan and Adriana Neligan (2005) also examine the effect of public subsidies on 
the nonprofit theater in England.  Their emphasis is on determining whether the public subsidies 
affect decisions regarding the composition of the repertoire presented in recipient theaters.  By 
regressing the Conventionality Index for 40 grant-aided English theaters on the size of the 
subsidy relative to total income, the size of the theater, the theater’s location, and the population 
and average income in the area, they show that increases in state subsidies result in less 
conventionality in the English theaters.  
Current evidence supports the proposition that both the amount and source of funding 
affect decision-makers’ goals and changes in funding are likely to affect their choice of 
repertoire.  Following these authors, we examine the effect of public lump-sum subsidies 
(unrestricted government grants) on orchestra repertoire.  The data, supplied by the League of 
Symphony Orchestras (formerly the American Symphony Orchestra League) also allow us to 
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determine whether lump-sum grants by businesses and individuals have similar effects as those 
provided by public agencies.  We attempt to determine the effect of these grants on the 
preferences of orchestra directors to perform the more popular works with more audience appeal 
and the contemporary works composed within the last 25 years. 
 
Data and Model 
 The League of Symphony Orchestras (LSO) gathers detailed information on all sources 
and types of revenues and expenses, orchestra repertoire, and attendance by type of concert for 
member orchestras.  The repertoire data, which are available on the Leagues’ web-site, contain 
the complete programs of each orchestra including composers, selections, and performance 
dates.  Highlighted in the summary are the top twenty composers with the largest number of 
selections scheduled (Mozart is the Babe Ruth of this group), and the “contemporary” composers 
(works composed within the past 25 years). From the orchestra schedules we can identify which 
orchestras are playing the popular works and which are showcasing the contemporary pieces. 
 Financial data used in this paper are from the confidential reports filed by member 
orchestras and compiled by the LSO each year.  Among the data contained in these reports are 
the amounts and sources of all unrestricted funds received by each orchestra.  Included are funds 
from federal, state, and local government, individuals, businesses, investments, community 
groups, and other sources.  LSO have provided us with these data on a confidential basis for our 
research purposes.  Combining the data from LSO with some socioeconomic and demographic 
data from the census allows the estimation of numerous equations designed to test the effects of 
unrestricted (lump-sum) grants from various sources on the choice of symphony orchestra 
repertoire. 
 We compute a set of ratios designed to approximate the Conventionality Index mentioned 
above.  Specifically, like Heilbrun, we compute Herfindahl Indices for each orchestra.  Virtually 
every performance includes works by the most popular classical composers; larger Herfindahl 
Indices would be associated with greater conventionality in programming.  We also construct a 
second index of conventionality based on the average number of times the twenty most popular 
composers’ works are performed per concert for each orchestra. Larger indices are indicative of 
more conventional programming.  To represent less conventional programming, we construct an 
index based on the average number of times the contemporary composers’ works are performed 
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per concert by each orchestra.  The measure is an attempt to determine whether lump-sum grants 
allow greater freedom or flexibility in orchestra programming, and which types of orchestras are 
more likely outlets for the works of newer composers. 
 The explanatory variables that best explained orchestra repertoire include the unrestricted 
grants received from federal, state, and local governments as a percent of orchestra total 
operating budgets.  The percent of individuals over age sixty-five and the percent of the 
population with at a Bachelors Degree in the orchestra’s market area are also included in our 
model.  Finally, the number of selections played per concert, the number of “pop-concerts” and 
the number of regular concerts performed by each orchestra are included as explanatory 
variables.  Descriptive statistics of all variables are presented in Tables 1 and  2. 
 
Empirical Results 
 Table 3 contains the estimates of the models designed to capture the effects of lump-sum 
grants from government sources and other control variables on the average number of times the 
most popular composers are performed per concert. In Table 4, we present results including the 
same independent variables on the number of contemporary works per concert.  All models are 
corrected for  hetroskedasticity.  We do not report the results of the models estimating the 
determinants of the Herfindahl Index for each orchestra because our efforts proved fruitless. 
 The column labeled Model 1 in Table 3 presents the estimates of the model for all 105 
orchestras in our sample.  The remaining columns in Table 3 include the results for orchestras 
grouped by the size of the operating budget.  Based on the full sample, government grants appear 
to have no effect on orchestra repertoire. The number of pieces per concert and the total number 
of regular series concerts are the only significant factors in explaining the preference for the 
classical composers.  An increase in the number of pieces played per concert and the length of 
the season will increase the number of popular selections per concert.  
 Given the range of size of the members of the League of Symphony Orchestras, we 
consider the impact separately for large, medium, and small size orchestras.  While many of the 
descriptive statistics are similar across orchestra size, there is a striking difference in the number 
of total concerts in a season, which was s significant determinant of the popular pieces in the 
repertoire.  When the sample is broken up by orchestra size, the number of concerts is no longer 
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a significant determinant of repertoire.  The number of pieces per concert remains significant; 
more pieces per concert increases the number of popular pieces per concert across the board. 
 For the larger orchestras, with operating budgets greater than $10 million, the remaining 
significant factor affecting the choice of the popular classics is the age of the population.  The 
larger orchestras will select a repertoire more slanted towards the classics in markets with a more 
elderly population.  If the patrons reflect the composition of the population this may reflect the 
taste of the elderly for the classics. 
 For orchestras with operating budgets less than $10 million, models 3-5 in Table 3, the 
results show a significant impact of state government support on repertory selections.  For both 
medium and small orchestras, greater state government support decreases the number of 
“popular” selections, perhaps allowing more unconventional programming.  This result is 
somewhat undermined for the medium sized orchestras when considering the impact of federal 
unrestricted grants.  From column 5 (model 4), an increase in unrestricted federal grants 
significantly increases the number of popular pieces included in the repertoire.  If government 
grants allow more unconventional, less popular repertory selections, we would expect to see a 
significant, negative impact at both the state and federal level.  For smaller orchestras, with 
operating budgets less than $3 million (model 5), education has a significant impact on 
repertoire.  As the education level of the population in the market area increases, the orchestras 
play fewer popular selections per performance.  Perhaps more educated patrons prefer less 
conventional selections or composers. 
 Table 4 contains the estimates of the effects of government grants and the control 
variables on the “Unconventionality Index,” the number of contemporary pieces per concert.  In  
model 1 (column 2) of Table 2, we present the results for the full sample of 105 orchestras.  The 
results are weakly supportive of the proposition that federal and state grants encourage less 
conventional programs, while local grants tend to discourage such activity.  The results for the 
larger orchestras (column 3) add support to the proposition that local government grants are 
aimed at more conventional, less innovative programs.  As Pierce argued, local support is 
probably aimed at increasing audience size and less likely to be interested in supporting less 
conventional programs. 
 The results for the medium and small orchestras (models 4 and 5) show that federal and 
state grants do have the effect of nudging the repertoires of these orchestras toward less 
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conventional programs.  As with the popular selections, more pieces per concert allow more 
contemporary pieces to be played.  While age has no influence, education has a significant 
impact for both the large and medium size orchestras.  A more educated population in the market 
area significantly increases the selection of contemporary pieces.  This is consistent with the 
findings for the model of popular pieces for the smaller orchestras, that more educated patrons 
may prefer more innovative programming. 
 
Conclusion 
 The hypothesis that we wished to test in this paper is that unrestricted lump-sum grants 
allow for more innovative programming.  If the orchestra is heavily dependent on ticket sales 
they may be forced to perform the popular classics that have greater audience appeal.  While 
orchestras may wish to pursue more innovative programming featuring newer composers, 
revenue requirements may force a selection of pieces that are more recognizable and “easy” to 
listen to.  For orchestras to showcase the newer composers they require outside, unrestricted 
funding such as federal and state lump-sum grants. 
 The models and empirical results are not consistently supportive of this hypothesis.  
While state lump-sum grants decrease the number of popular pieces performed by medium and 
small orchestras, the impact of government support on contemporary programming is rather 
weak.  There is a lot of variation in the programming across the full sample of orchestras, yet the 
effect of government funding on these repertory choices is uncertain.  The uncertainty may be a 
result of the model specification, estimation method, variable measurement, or the hypothesis 
itself. 
 Assuming the hypothesis is correct, that the mission of the orchestra directors may be at 
odds with the taste of the patrons, one problem in testing this hypothesis may be the 
measurement of conventionality.  From the LSO reports, we have assumed that “popular” pieces 
reflect conventional repertories that align with the preferences of the patrons.  Patrons are 
assumed to prefer the familiar classics, generating greater revenue and financial stability.  We 
have assumed that one of the goals of the orchestra director is to promote the newer, innovative 
composers.  If this is at odds with the tastes of the patrons, then revenue would suffer.  This 
innovative “unconventional” programming is measure by the number of contemporary pieces 
played.  It may not be the case that “contemporary” pieces capture the artistic ideal postulated as 
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part of the nonprofit mission.  In fact, contemporary may include pieces that are not “quality” but 
are current and popular and included for their audience appeal.   
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics – Full Sample 
 
 
Variables:  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Obs 
Popular/Total Concerts 1.47 1.33 3.25 0.42 0.66 105 
Contemporary/Total Concerts 0.17 0.13 0.65 0.00 0.14 105 
Federal Govt.  Support 38,524 0 1,644,175 0 163,918 105 
State Govt. Support 195,587 47,795 2,791,791 0 507,640 105 
Local Govt. Support 187,378 28,550 2,770,597 0 383,149 105 
Total Operating Budget 12,698,674 3,503,667 122,000,000 152,794 21,831,294 105 
Federal/Operating Budget 0.32% 0.00% 8.15% 0.00% 1.02% 105 
State/Operating Budget 2.25% 1.41% 23.41% 0.00% 3.42% 105 
Local/Operating Budget 2.60% 0.85% 53.99% 0.00% 5.86% 105 
% Over Age 65 12.44% 11.69% 32.68% 7.36% 3.88% 105 
% With Bachelor Degree 27.02% 26.18% 58.79% 8.98% 7.35% 105 
Pieces per concert 2.64 2.40 7.25 0.67 1.18 105 
Number of Pop Concerts 9.30 6.00 79.00 0.00 11.99 105 
Number of Regular Concerts 28.17 15.00 116.00 4.00 27.73 105 
Total Concerts 37.48 22.00 165.00 5.00 33.96 105 
       
 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics –Mean Values Individual Samples 
 
 
Variables: 
Model 1 
Obs=105 
Model 2 
Obs=34 
Model 3 
Obs=71 
Model 4 
Obs=24 
Model 5 
Obs=47 
Popular/Total Concerts 1.47 1.44 1.48 1.31 1.56 
Contemporary/Total Concerts 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.14 
Federal Govt.  Support 38,524 97,372 10,344 21,164 4,819 
State Govt. Support 195,587 492,944 53,191 104,593 26,944 
Local Govt. Support 187,378 436,285 68,183 153,105 24,818 
Total Operating Budget 12,698,674 33,479,972 2,747,066 5,424,360 1,379,937 
Federal/Operating Budget 0.32% 0.31% 0.32% 0.39% 0.29% 
State/Operating Budget 2.25% 2.53% 2.11% 1.77% 2.29% 
Local/Operating Budget 2.60% 1.96% 2.91% 2.44% 3.15% 
% Over Age 65 12.44% 11.40% 12.93% 12.31% 13.25% 
% With Bachelor Degree 27.02% 28.32% 26.39% 25.49% 26.85% 
Pieces per concert 2.64 2.37 2.77 2.23 3.04 
Number of Pop Concerts 9.30 17.76 5.25 11.71 1.96 
Number of Regular Concerts 28.17 59.62 13.11 19.92 9.64 
Total Concerts 37.48 77.38 18.37 31.63 11.60 
Model 1:  Full Sample 
Model 2:  Budget>10 million 
Model 3:  Budget<10 million 
Model 4:  Budget <10 million and >3 million 
Model 5:  Budget< 3 million  
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Table 3:  Dependent Variable - Popular Pieces Per Concert 
Coefficient Estimates – t statistics in parenthesis 
 
Independent Variables: 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
Federal/ Operating Budget -0.0905 2.2449 -0.0574 11.3105 -0.8984 
 (-0.03) (0.38) (-0.01) (1.65) (-0.15) 
State/Operating Budget -0.8857 -0.6962 -4.3304 -8.5054 -6.4279 
 (-1.07) (-0.95) (-1.91) (-2.17) (-2.12) 
Local/Operating Budget -0.7428 -0.3760 -0.4616 -1.8798 1.2006 
 (-1.10) (-0.28) (-0.52) (-0.73) (1.09) 
Percent over age 65 0.8308 0.8179 1.4791 1.9085 -1.4868 
 (1.61) (1.71) (1.30) (1.12) (-0.89) 
Percent with BA Degree 0.0025 0.6583 -0.5349 -0.8645 -1.1079 
 (0.01) (0.89) (-1.02) (-0.71) (-1.69) 
Pieces Per Concert 0.5030 0.5611 0.4582 0.6193 0.3932 
 (16.72) (11.06) (11.30) (8.64) (8.22) 
Number Pop Concerts -0.0031 -0.0018 -0.0082 -0.0013 -0.0153 
 (-1.30) (-0.72) (-1.69) (-0.18) (-0.99) 
Number Regular Concerts 0.0034 0.0019 0.0071 0.0106 0.0178 
 (2.72) (1.20) (1.58) (1.34) (1.45) 
Constant Term 0.0108 -0.2350 0.2149 -0.1381 0.8306 
 (0.08) (-1.06) (1.01) (-0.38) (2.76) 
Number of Observations 105 34 71 24 47 
R-squared .73 .90 .70 .93 .66 
Model 1:  Full Sample 
Model 2:  Budget>10 million 
Model 3:  Budget<10 million 
Model 4:  Budget <10 million and >3 million 
Model 5:  Budget< 3 million 
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Table 4:  Dependent Variable - Contemporary Pieces Per Concert 
Coefficient Estimates – t statistics in parenthesis 
 
Independent Variables: 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
Federal/ Operating Budget 2.2583 -2.7283 2.6592 7.7043 0.0388 
 (1.66) (-1.13) (1.59) (2.85) (0.02) 
State/Operating Budget 0.5187 0.2885 0.7977 -1.5900 2.6995 
 (1.56) (0.96) (0.92) (-1.02) (2.68) 
Local/Operating Budget -0.4215 -1.4080 -0.2985 0.5801 -0.5134 
 (-1.55) (-2.56 (-0.87) (0.57) (-1.40) 
Percent over age 65 -0.1874 -0.0658 -0.3223 -0.3758 0.7388 
 (-0.91) (-0.34) (-0.74) (-0.56) (1.34) 
Percent with BA Degree -0.0084 0.8630 -0.1088 1.1875 -0.2488 
 (-0.05) (2.84) (-0.54) (2.47) (-1.15) 
Pieces Per Concert 0.0548 0.0871 0.0511 0.0419 0.0644 
 (4.53) (4.20) (3.28) (1.48) (4.05) 
Number Pop Concerts 0.0012 -0.0007 0.0029 -0.0007 0.0010 
 (1.25) (-0.66) (1.56) (-0.24) (0.20) 
Number Regular Concerts 0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0023 -0.0001 
 (0.19) (-1.60) (-0.35) (-0.74) (-0.03) 
Constant Term 0.0276 -0.1491 0.0625 -0.1340 -0.1245 
 (0.48) (-1.65) (0.77) (-0.93) (-1.25) 
Number of Observations 105 34 71 24 47 
R-squared .089 .499 .058 .553 .172 
Model 1:  Full Sample 
Model 2:  Budget>10 million 
Model 3:  Budget<10 million 
Model 4:  Budget <10 million and >3 million 
Model 5:  Budget< 3 million 
 
